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BURCH v. LOUISIANA

BURDEN OF PROOF
Although the Constitution does not mention burden of
proof, certain principles are widely accepted as having
constitutional status. The first and most significant of these
is the rule that in a criminal case the government must
prove its case ‘‘beyond a REASONABLE DOUBT.’’ This is the
universal COMMON LAW rule, and was said by the Supreme
Court in IN RE WINSHIP (1970) to be an element of DUE
PROCESS. This standard is commonly contrasted with proof
‘‘by a preponderance of the evidence’’ or ‘‘by clear and
convincing evidence.’’ The standard of proof is in practice
not easily susceptible to further clarification or elaboration.
To what matters does the burden apply? The Winship
Court said it extended to ‘‘every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [a defendant] is charged.’’ The
government must prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt. But suppose the defendant raises a defense of ALIBI, insanity, duress, or diplomatic immunity? With respect
to such defenses the usual rule is that the defendant may
be required to produce some evidence supporting his
claim; if he does not, that defense will not be considered

by the jury. By what standard should the jury be instructed
to evaluate such a defense? Should they deny the defense
unless they are persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has established it? Or does the
‘‘burden of persuasion’’ on the issue raised by the defendant remain on the government, so that the jury must acquit unless persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defense falls? On this complicated question there is no
settled view. The answer should probably vary with the
kind of defense: alibi, for example, is not really an affirmative defense but a denial of facts charged. Such a defense as diplomatic immunity, however, might be regarded
as one upon which the defendant should bear the burden
of proof.
The foregoing structure is complicated by the existence
of ‘‘presumptions,’’ that is, legislative or judicial statements to the effect that if one fact is proved—say, possession of marijuana—another fact essential to conviction
may be ‘‘presumed’’—say, that the marijuana was illegally
imported. The Supreme Court has held such a legislative
presumption valid when the proved fact makes the ultimate fact more likely than not.
The burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a
critical element of due process. Like the requirements
that laws be public and their prohibitions comprehensible
and prospective, that trials be public and by jury, and that
the defendant have counsel, the burden of proof limits the
power of the government to impose arbitrary or oppressive punishments. It reinforces the rights of the defendant
not to be a witness against himself nor to take the stand,
for it imposes upon the government the task of proving its
whole case on its own. A lower standard of proof would
pressure defendants to involve themselves in the process
of their own condemnation.
In civil cases, the rule is simply stated: the legislature
may decide upon the burden of proof as it wishes, usually
choosing the ‘‘preponderance of the evidence’’ test. In
specialized proceedings, such as motions to suppress evidence for criminal trials, special rules have evolved. (See
STANDARDS OF REVIEW.)
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